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THE

CAUCASUS

AND ITS

SIGNIFICANCE TO RUSSIA

WITH REGARD TO HER EUROPEAN AND ASIAN RELATIONS:

A POLITICAL, GEOGRAPHICAL, AND MILITARY INVESTIGATION,

BY

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IMPERIAL AUSTRIAN INFANTRY REGIMENT NO. 34.

1877.

Translated from the German

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BY

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SIMLA:
GOVERNMENT CENTRAL BRANCH PRESS.
1878.

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THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE

EVER since the will of Peter the Great, the Russian Cabinet has been longing for the catastrophe now about to burst over the Turkish Empire. Down to the present day, Russia has obstinately endeavoured to gain a firm footing on the Balkan Peninsula, and to make herself mistress of Constantinople.

The present policy and attitude of the Powers leave scarcely a doubt that Russia has this time succeeded in gaining them over to her ideas, which, as far as they have been proclaimed, are said to be strictly limited to the task of freeing the Christian nationalities from the Turkish yoke, and of creating a state of things which would guarantee them an existence of spiritual and physical life.

Availing herself of the unexampled disorder of the Ottoman State finances, the heavy oppression of the crescent towards all other denominations, and of the violent acts of a covetous fanatical bureaucracy—which offer Russia an occasion to adjudge herself the right of executing a long-cherished plan—she is arming to dismember the Turkish Realm under the pretext of regulating its internal affairs. This is simply an outrage on the civilization of Europe.

But, having witnessed the repeated displays of her power to the same end during the present century, the world can be no longer deceived by the illusion of Russia's 'purely benevolent intentions.' Who is there that would still believe Russia capable of sacrificing millions of money and the blood of thousands of her subjects, solely for the purpose of improving the lot of the Christians under Turkish rule?

The claims of her own interest have ever been the sole guide of Russia's policy, and the pretext for the present invasion of Turkey—the fourth of its kind since the commencement of this century—is merely intended to mask her traditional schemes of conquest. Russia's real object is to effect a lodgement on the Balkan Peninsula, and thereby to become paramount on the Black Sea and to extend her sphere of power in Europe. As in 1795, she is sure to drop the mask as soon as this object has been gained.

Between the events which marked the epoch of Catherine II., and Russia's latest moves, there is undeniably a striking analogy.

Ever desirous of extending her dominion towards the south, the Polish war of succession (after the demise of August the Strong, 1733) afforded Russia a welcome chance for intruding into the Polish quarrel. By the grace of Russian bayonets the Elector of Saxony became King of Poland, but in reality he was merely a Russian vassal.

Then, as now, Russia understood how to hide her intentions under the cloak of benevolence, the better to realize her wishes regarding Poland, the overthrow of which had been hatched as far back as 1733. The year 1795 witnessed the dénouement of the drama: Russia incorporated 8,000 square miles = 4,603 myriam. of Polish territory with her dominions, and the result was a considerable approach of her frontier towards countries whose inhabitants are of kin to the Russian people and profess their faith.

During the following epoch of peace, Russia was busily engaged in creating what must be called a community of interests between the Empire and those cognate petty nations, with a view of utilizing them for her own interests at the proper time, that is, to widen her sphere of power in Europe by means of their support.

The insurrections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the attack made by the Vassal-State Servia, and the war of the Montenegro Principality, justify our opinion: for, not content with having supplied arms to, and subsidizing, all these combatants, Russia has actively supported them by permitting her subjects to swell their ranks. These skirmishes formed the prelude to the sanguinary drama now being acted in Europe and Asia: they were needful to weaken Turkey as much as possible beforehand, to save appearances in the opinion of Europe, to gain the Powers for her interests, and to make time for the necessary war-preparations.

The events of 1828-29 and 1853-55 had not been lost upon Russia, and her present action has been well prepared, politically as well as from a military point of view. On both previous occasions her design was frustrated by the European Powers, who, having fathomed Russia's intention, checked her aggressive policy by their "Halt! so far and no farther." In 1854-55, it was especially the attitude of Austria which paralysed Russia's action, for Austria, appre-

hending danger to her own existence, adopted a policy which arrested Russia's arm at the very moment of clutching at the long-coveted prize. Under the onerous fetters then forced on her, Russia is still writhing, because the restrictions respecting the Black Sea under which she was placed, have deprived her of an essential factor for the realization of her designs.

Fully comprehending the situation, and alive to the difficulties which beset her on the European side, Russia thereupon changed her tactics, and has since sought to gain the desired end by way of advancing through Asia. Finding that all endeavours to extend her south-western frontier were being frustrated by the European Powers, who opposed them even by force of arms, Russia has, ever since 1828-29, steadily worked to open Asia Minor for further movements. To this end the intermediate highlands have been turned into a secure basis for warlike operations, a basis through which Russia commands a free passage. By these means she has gained a double purpose: on the west her armies may now advance through Asia Minor in order to reach the southern shores of the Black Sea, and Constantinople; and on the east she may energetically support her operations in Central Asia. In short, it needs but a glance at the map, to comprehend the full strength of Russia in possession of the Caucasus, and how very valuable to her the command over this mountain region really is.

England and Turkey had long since understood this, and have acted accordingly. To forestall the danger, Turkey has fortified Armenia—England trying to achieve the same object by increasing her influence over the nations of Central Asia. At the commencement of the present century the British Cabinet, apprehensive for England's trade with Turkey and India, left no stone unturned to counterpoise Russia, and to put difficulties in the way of her onward march in Central Asia.

England courted the friendship of Persia. Missions, supplied with large sums of money and empowered to make great promises, left London and Calcutta for Teheran; and on the appearance of the ghost that rose in the shape of a Russo-French-Persian invasion of India, England employed every means at her disposal to break the powerful influence of France at Teheran. This object was at last gained by means of a preliminary agreement, the third article of which stipulated that Persia was to be closed against the passage

of any European army intended to invade India. For this favor, however, England had to pay large subsidies, which became a heavy burden on the Indian budget.

After the conclusion of peace at Gulistan between Russia and Persia (1813), the preliminary agreement between England and Persia became a formal treaty, by virtue of the sixth article of which England had bound herself to support Persia with an army from India whenever Russia should attack that country. In fact, such an attack on the part of Russia was to be regarded as a *casus belli* by England, the latter being bound forthwith to fight the common enemy. In 1826, however, England lost her influential position with Persia.

Supported by British gold and arms, the Shah attacked the Russians then engaged in Caucasia. Sanguine of an easy victory, he was in hopes of regaining the provinces lost in 1813, and of effecting an entrance into the Caucasus, never again to leave it. But General Paskevich defeated and scattered the Persian forces; and in 1827, Russia having taken the offensive, the Shah lost Nakshivan (Nakhichevan), and the Khanship of Erivan—while England, evading her engagement on the paltriest pretexts, shuffled off. Hence the Russo-Persian war had no sooner ceased, than England's influence vanished as rapidly as it had been gained; for the Court of Teheran understood the part that England had wished Persia to undertake, and which was to the effect of keeping Russia engaged in Caucasia, to check her advance the Hindukush, and to suffer Persia to be crushed for the sake of England.

Finding that nothing more was to be hoped for from Persia's friendship, England assumed a hostile attitude, and compelled the Shah to abandon his design on Herat (convention of 1853). This exasperated him to the highest pitch, and, changing his policy altogether, he made friends with Russia, going the length of concentrating troops near Tabríz and Kermanshah (during the Crimean War), in order to make common cause with Russia against England. But for want of means, this intention would have been carried out. In 1856, England made war on Persia, with a view, on the one hand to arrest the growth of the Shah's power, and on the other, to reduce Russia's influence in Central Asia—in which, however, England failed. For Persia has after all ruled at Herat, while Russia's influence, far from diminishing, actually increased. Russia even undertook the

construction of railways in Persia, and the time is not far off when she may be expected to place the line, built with Russian money, under her own protection: that is to say, when the entire line as far as Bandar Abbas will be militarily occupied by the Russian Government, and the most exposed stations will be fortified. This much is certain, firstly: that the time of Persia's liberty of action (*Freiheit der Entschliessungen*) has already gone by, such liberty now being illusive; and, secondly: that Iran must shortly sink to the level of a mere dependency of Russia.

Two [political] currents, running counter with one another, are therefore threatening to meet in Central Asia. From the South, England endeavours to utilize Kashgar and Afghanistan as bulwarks against the dangers which, drawing nigher and nigher, menace her existence in India; from the North, Russia seeks to advance southwards, in order to gain a road to India.

That country [Persia, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan] situated between Russia's present frontier and the Indian Ocean,* excepted, the Russians have, within the last 25 years, already succeeded in conquering Central Asia. In 1847 their boundary line ran across the Ili to the Alatau Range, and along the rivers Chú and Syr Darya. A little later they crossed the first-named river [Chú] to the end of gaining a natural frontier abutting upon the Kirgiz Alatau, the Boroldai, and the Karatau. In 1853 the Syr Darya was occupied as far as Akmeched, and in 1855 Russia established new colonies on the Ili. The year 1860 was marked by the capture of Tokmak and Pishpek; and, undertaking a series of conquests in quick succession, her Asiatic possessions soon extended to the heart of the Bokharian Khanate (1868). In 1871 Russia added the Kulja district to her Empire, thereby separating Mongolia from East Turkestan; and two years later, after the successful termination of the expedition to Khiva in 1873, her southern frontier was pushed on to the Amu Darya. Consequent on these moves ahead, the boundary line of Russia's Central Asian dominions now to be taken into account, extends from the eastern extremities of the Tianshan Mountains to the mouth of the Attrek on the Caspian Sea.

Russia's expedition to Khiva, and her influence, now reaching as far as Bokhara and Kokand, claim the full

* [More correctly the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.]—*Tr.*

attention not only of England, but likewise that of Europe at large; for as in Asia Minor, so in Central Asia, Russia is preparing herself for events which can hardly take place without lastingly affecting our own quarter of the Globe.

From what we have now said about Central Asia, it will be seen that, before long, Russia is sure to swallow the Khanates of Khiva, Bokhara and Kokand, which are already completely within her grasp. This accomplished, her sway will extend to the foot of the Hindukush, after which a descent into the oases of East Turkestan, and the incorporation of the latter with her Empire, will probably follow as a matter of course. The Russo-Kashgarian frontier line runs from the Katundába to the Terek Daban, that is, from the sources of the Kunges to those of the Syr: hence the Russians are *de facto* already commanding all the passes and crossing points leading into the Kashgar plains.

East Turkestan forms one of those bulwarks which England is anxious to build up as a protection of her Indian Empire against Russia. Nevertheless, (we can no longer even doubt this) Russia has the predomination at the Court of Kashgar, owing to her commanding military position above mentioned. From the Shatyr Kul the Russian frontier runs northerly, across the Jossi and Kogart Hills to the Urtaktau, from which it turn westwards, retaining this direction as far as the sources of the Tenling River; from the latter it continues towards the south-west, in the direction of the Ferghana Valley, whence, turning to the south-east, it reaches the sources of the Zarafshan—thus completely clasping Kokand from the north, east, and west, *i.e.*, as much of that Khanate as still remains.*

Russia had no sooner gained the object of her aggressive policy in Turkestan, than her attention became occupied by Bokhara, which, seeing that it adjoins Afghanistan, is a country of great importance to Russia—always bearing in mind how vast an interest the English have at stake in Kabul. In 1866 the Russians took Forts Uratiube and Jizak, by means of which they command the valley of the Syr.

With regard to Khiva, Russia has operated as successfully as elsewhere. Her influence there is of no mean order,

* [Kokand was annexed on the 2nd-14th March 1876; the author's pamphlet is dated 1877. Hence he is clearly ignoring the fact—perhaps to shine the better as a prophet.]—*Tr.*

and to have the Khanate well under thumb, the Russians have not been slow in constructing new forts on the Oxus.

As to Afghanistan, it forms the focus, as it were, of the whole Central Asian question, for it is there that the fate of the British power in India will be ultimately decided—unless the English resolve upon defending themselves on the Indus. This, however, is hardly probable, except if they be driven to it by force of circumstances: which, it is true, does not lie beyond the range of the possible, because ever since 1839-42, the Afghans have not sympathized with the English. After the withdrawal of her garrisons from Afghanistan (1842), England tried to regain her lost influence by means of aiding the Afghans in their contest for Herat with Persia. To this end, she subsidized them to the amount of 2,600,000 fls. per annum, and continued paying them 100,000 fls. monthly, as long as the services of Afghanistan appeared to be worth paying for in the opinion of the Indian Government.

But despite all the presents in the shape of arms and cash made by the English, the relations between Kabul and Calcutta have been steadily getting more and more strained, the cause of which would appear to be that, in the opinion of the Afghans, the English might fail in averting the danger of a Russian attack from them—seeing that, hitherto, their protests have failed to check Russia's onward march in Asia—an aprehension which, in all probability, induces the Afghans to follow the safer course of placing themselves upon a friendly footing with Russia. This could not escape the English, and, comprehending the state of things we have described, they make no longer a secret of their intention to seize Afghanistan anew, and [there] to build strongholds for the purpose of providing outworks in defence of India. With this end in view, the English have hit upon Herat and Kandahar.

Extending their territory in Central Asia, the Russians have, at the same time, taken wide tracts of country from China (in the remote east, 1854-59). Having made Russian possessions of the Amúr and of Ussúri, they also appropriated some of the steppe-lands about Lake Zaisan (1864-69), and installed themselves on Sakhalin Island. Properly speaking, these acquisitions have no direct bearing upon our theme: still, the better to illustrate Russia's traditional policy of conquest, we could not but shortly mention them.

From this succinct exposé of affairs, both in Europe and Asia, it will be admitted to follow that the interests of the continental European Powers are identical with those of Great Britain: for every addition of power to Russia is a menace in one direction or other. Hence we put up no empty vision, if we assert that the subduement of the Caucasian mountaineers was not the sole aim of Russia's policy: placing herself in possession of the Caucasus, she had higher objects in view. Russia fights for the trade of the world. To this end she is ever ready to seize fresh territories and to swell her population. Hence, too, arose the necessity of commanding a basis from which she may, indirectly, influence Europe, and at the same time back, and effectually support, her operations in Asia!

This basis is the Caucasus, which we will now endeavour to prove.

THE

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WITH REGARD TO HER EUROPEAN AND ASIAN RELATIONS.

Geography and Statistics.

The Caucasus, forming the south-eastern corner of the Russian Empire, abuts upon Astrakhan and the plain of the Don on the north, Persia and Armenia on the south; upon the Black Sea and the Azov on the west; and upon the Caspian on the east.

The area of the entire Viceroyship amounts to 7,938 square miles* = 4568·03 sq. Mm.; its population numbers 4,157,517 souls, that is, 612·8 per square mile = 0·575 sq. Mm. The country is divided into—

Cis-Caucasia, and—
Trans-Caucasia.

The main chain of mountains extends from west to east. This highland region rises in three distinct ranges, and is populated by a great variety of peoples and races. The most elevated and massive section of the Caucasian mountain system is formed by the Elbrus, attaining 17,425 feet in height. From this peak issue the following branch ranges:—

a, The Western Range, extending to the Strait of Kerch (which latter connects the Black Sea with the Azov);

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* [German miles, it is presumed.]—*Tr.*

b, The Eastern Range, extending to Cape Apsheron on the Caspian: (these two ranges, 150 miles in length, traverse the country almost in a straight line from west to east);

c, The South-eastern Range, which overlaps the Persian frontier, and joins Mount Ararat; and—

d, That narrow ridge of hills which, extending along the coast of the Black Sea, runs into the Pontian Mountains trending away parallel with the sea-side.

Besides the above-named, some other peaks rise to considerable altitudes. The ridge-elevation of the principal ranges varies between 7,000 and 8,000 feet (=2212—2528 Mm.)

As to the formation of the Caucasian Mountains, they present the characteristic feature of several ranges running side by side in long rows, which are more or less connected with one another. Resulting from this configuration, there are highland valleys of 20 to 30 (=151—227 Mm.), or even more, miles in length, which the mountain ranges enclose in the manner of ramparts, and upon which nature herself has stamped the character of strongholds, as it were. From the bottom upwards and till the region of rock is reached, they are well wooded, the ridges being ever snow-capped. The dales and valleys abound in the most luxuriant vegetation, affording plenty of food for man and beast.

These highlands are intersected by many torrents and rivers, drawing their supply from a large number of glaciers. Their deeply embedded currents flow between steep craggy banks, and these ravines form as many obstructions [to troops]—in dry as well as in rainy seasons. In times of continuous rain-fall, or when the snow happens to melt rapidly, they reach a considerable height. The principal direction of their course is either north or southwards. On the north, a number of these streams help to form the Terek, which discharges into the Caspian (after passing Kizlyar); the rest dwindle away, and finally disappear, in the steppes of South Russia. The shortlived torrents descending southwards from the Western Branch, fall into the Black Sea. The mountain streams of the Eastern Range, commencing from the principal elevation, trend to the east, and those of the range which overlaps the Persian frontier, to the north; they form the River Kúr, which flows through the valley of Tiflis, and falls into the Caspian.

Means of Communication.

The perviousness was very inadequate. But by the construction of roadways the Russian Government have so far facilitated the accessibility of the mountains, that even large military bodies may now simultaneously cross them in several columns. Nevertheless, the rapid torrents render it very difficult to move troops in rainy weather, or during a sudden thaw, and at such times partial interruptions of all traffic are of frequent occurrence.

Owing to the peculiar configuration of these highlands and the independent spirit of the hill-population, the Russians succeeded but slowly in subduing the Caucasus; and while the struggle was yet having its course, they were making roads as they fought their way into the mountain recesses of the enemy. Acting on this plan, every rod of ground gained was immediately fortified, and connected with the country in rear; and thus each newly acquired strip of land was at once prepared for a basis of further operations, from whence the Russians, secretly concentrating themselves in superior numbers to the mountaineers, were enabled to attack them at important points and to surprise them in their rocky seats.

This sort of warfare led to the adoption of a strategical method by which the independent tribes have been fenced in by a network of roads, invariably connecting fortified points. These roads form lines either intervening between those tribes and the sea-coast, or separating them from each other, whereby their mutual intercourse and community of action were artificially rendered difficult; on the other hand, Russia's influence grew more and more paramount as she succeeded in isolating the resisting hill tribes.

In this wise, there originated successive lines of communication, whose diverging point is situated between Mozdok and Yekaterinograd on the 'Cossack-Line,' near the northern boundary of Caucasia, from which point the latter is connected with Stavropol, the seat of the Caucasian Government. The more lucidly to present this system of roads to our readers, we will treat separately of—

A. The longitudinal lines, and—

B. The transverse lines.

A. Longitudinal Lines of Communications.

These trend to the west and east of the 'Great Caucasian Roadway,' that, crossing the central part of the mountains,

traverses the entire highland system of the Caucasus. Commencing from Mozdok, this macadamized roadway passes through Yekaterinograd and Vladikafkas (fortress), crosses the Kazbek, and leads to Tiflis; from thence, running along the right bank of the Kúr, it turns to Saloglu, after which, taking a bend to the south-west, it reaches the stronghold of Alexandropol (*viâ* Karaklis). From Alexandropol a continuation of this line leads into Armenia, connecting the Caucasus with Kars, Erzeroum, and so forth. From this main artery issue the following branch lines, running westwards:—

a, The line from Kobi *viâ* Tib and Oni to Orbeli, from whence two roads run as follows: one by way of Khoni and Ozurgeti to Nikolaya (fort on the Black Sea); another to Kutais (fortress on the Poti-Tiflis railway), ultimately rejoining the Nikolaya branch;

b, The macadamized line from Tiflis *viâ* Gori to Akhaltsikh (fortress), from whence, crossing the frontier as an ordinary cart-way, it extends to Erzeroum;

And, running eastwards:—

a. This line issues a metaled branch to Erivan (between Tiflis and Alexandropol), from whence an ordinary road, turning to the west, runs into Armenia, crossing the frontier at Sumarly (stronghold); the line—

b. stretches from Elisabethpol to the fortress of Shusha (metaled), and from thence as a common road to Akh Oglan (stronghold), finally crossing the Persian frontier.

On the west of the great Caucasian roadway, the mountain chain is crossed by six, and on the east thereof by two, different lines. These are—

On the west:—

1, The line from the fortress of Andréyefsk to Anapa;

2, The line Ivanofskaya, Adagum, Krymskaya, Bakán, and Novorós, connecting the four last-named strongholds, by which it is defended; from Krymskaya this line issues a branch-road to the fortress of Gelenjik;

3, This line begins from Yekaterinodar, and connects the strongholds of Grigóryefsk, Défansk, and Tenginsk;

4, This line connects the fortress of Maikop with Fort Beloréchinsk on the one hand, and with Nizhnefarsk on the other; its extension from Maikop runs through the Shetlib Pass, and *viâ* Fort Hamyshki to Shakhé;

5, Commencing from Kaladjinsk, this line runs to Fort Ageryutinsk, crosses the pass of Pségashko, and terminates at the fortress of Gagri;

6, The line from Staroshovaya across the Marukh Pass to Fort Ashara, where it joins the road coming from the fortress of Ustjúgúta, to end at Sukhúm Kalé (stronghold and marine harbour).

All these lines are formed by ordinary cart-roads, connecting the shores of the Black Sea (naval harbours) with strongholds [in the interior of the Caucasus], and crossing the transversals.

On the east of the great Caucasian roadway the mountains are crossed by—

1 *a*, The macadamized line from Sholkozavodsk to Azavyurt (fortress) and Eugene-yefsk (fort), from whence a common road leads to Núkha (*viâ* Tsúdakhar and Kúrakh): From Núkha, *viâ* Elisabethpol, to the Shusha Fortress, the continuation of this line is again metaled, and from the last-named place an ordinary cart-way runs to Khudoverin on the Persian frontier; a macadamized branch of this line, connecting Kúrakh with Kúba, turns eastwards and strikes upon—

2 *a*, The metaled line from Sholkozavodsk by way of Azavyurt and the fortress of Temirkhanshura to Karabúdakkend, and from thence along the Caspian coast, *viâ* Kúba to Baku (Cape Apsheron); Baku and Saliony are connected by an ordinary road, running along the sea-side, but the further continuation of this line, leading through Prishib and Lenkoran to Fort Astara and Persia, is metaled. A branch-road, issuing from Prishib and running along the River Vilgash, leads into Persian territory.

These lines as well as the great Caucasian roadway are connected with the transverse lines I., II., and III. (see below), and serve as means of communication between the Caucasus and the strongholds protecting its frontier against Armenia and Persia.

B. Transverse Lines of Communication.

I. This line, commencing from the Strait of Kerch, and running *viâ* Tamán and Andréyefsk, is metaled as far as Yekaterinodar, from whence a common cart-road, intervening between Grigóryefsk, Beloréchinsk, Nizhnefarsk, Kaladjinsk, Andrukhofsk, Psémensk, Staroshovaya, and Ust-júgúta, extends to Nalchik; thence, the metaling being resumed, it runs to Cherek, turns northwards to Úrukh, and continues *viâ* Yekaterinograd and Mozdok (following the left bank of the Terek) to Kizlyar;

II. The ordinary cart-road which trends along the north-eastern coast of the Black Sea, connecting all fortified points, marine ports, and towns, as far as Poti, from whence a macadamized road, leading through Kutais, Suram, and Gori, runs to Tiflis and, along the right bank of the Kúr, to Elisabethpol; thence, crossing the Kúr, it goes on to Shemakha and Baku;

III. This line, following the frontier from Nikolaya to Ozurgeti (between which points it is metaled), continues as a common cart-way to Akhaltsikh, Akhalkalaki, Alexandropol, Ani, and (along the left bank of the Arpa) *viâ* Sardarabad to Erivan, from whence a metaled road, following the left bank of the Aras, extends as far as Ordúbad.

Lastly, we have to mention the 'Rostof-Vladikafkas Railroad' with its Piatigorsk branch-line, connecting the Caucasus with Taganrog and with the entire railway-system of Russia; and the 'Poti-Tiflis Railroad.'

Military Review.

The Caucasian system of roads is calculated to facilitate the movement of troops in every direction, whether acting on the offensive or on the defensive.

Three of the longitudinal lines cross the mountains, being at the same time connected with the transversals I., II., and III.; and six longitudinal lines strike upon the transversals II. and III. Each transversal forms a '*Rokade*'-line,* favouring the concentration of troops in any chosen locality, and all have been constructed in deference to strategical requirements. The worth of the entire network of these Caucasian roads is further enhanced by fortified military stations, forts, and strongholds, protecting and securing the same: and by the Rostof-Vladikafkas railway, a line of the greatest importance, greatly facilitating the transport of war-material of every kind from the interior of Russia. As to the Poti-Tiflis line, it might serve as a means for rapidly shifting forces; otherwise it has no general importance: nor can it acquire any until the Russian Government succeed in maintaining a fleet, at least equal to that of Turkey, on the Black Sea. For till then the Porte may at any time blockade the coasts and interrupt all communication by water.

Fortification and Towns.

Speaking of the roads, we had already occasion to mention the strongholds of Caucasia. We will now proceed to name the most important of these points, giving details as far as they are known.

Cis-Caucasia.

Gubernia (governorship) Stavropol: City of Stavropol, the new capital of Cis-Caucasia; the fortress crowns a high mountain.

Terek Region: Vladikafkas, and Mozdok on the Terek, commanding the entrance by way of the great Caucasian roadway. Vladikafkas bars the principal line of communication connecting Stavropol with Tiflis.—Konstantinoyarsk, fortress on the Little Kúma, situated at the foot of Mount Beshta (4,300 feet).—George-yefsk, surrounded by low swamps.—Kizlyar, fortress above the mouth of the Terek.

* [Perhaps "connecting"-line? I cannot trace the meaning of this term, nor it proper equivalent in English.]—*Tr.*

Trans-Caucasia.

Gubernia Tiflis: City of Tiflis, the capital of Georgia [Gruzinia], on both banks of the Kúr; elevation 1,350 feet; the city proper lies on the right bank of the river, and behind it, on the south side, upon a rock, stands the ancient turret-fortress of Nariklea with its low-descending walls.

Gori, town and fortress on the Kúr.

Elisabethpol (Ganja), fortified town on the Ganja.

Lenkoran and Baku, fortified ports, both on the west-coast of the Caspian Sea.

Shusha, fortress, built upon high precipitous rocks.

Erivan, town adjoining the fortress, which measures 0·90 Km. in circumference, and commands a bare table-land; the works consist of a double wall; the military importance of the place is insignificant.

Alexandropol (formerly Gumri), town on the Arpachai, and a stronghold of the first class, capable of holding a force of 60,000 men, and commanding the road to the Turkish fortress of Kars (situated five miles = 37·90 Km. from Alexandropol).

Poti, fortified port on the east-coast of the Black Sea; the fortifications lie between swamps and lakes.

Rionsk.

Redoubt Kalé and Anaklia, fortified harbours.

Nikolaya, redoubt crowning a sand-down..

Kutais, fortress, barring the Poti-Tiflis railroad.

Akhaltsikh, commanding a plateau; under the Turkish Government it constituted one of the principal strongholds of Asia Minor *(Vorderasien.)*

Derbend, fortified town on the Caspian, situated near the famous Caucaso-Caspian Gate.

In Abkhasia, a narrow highland tract extending for 25 miles on the south-west side of the Caucasus, the Russians permanently occupy a number of military stations and harbours; amongst others: Ilori, Dranda, Kelasúr, Sukhum Kalé, Psyrta, Bombara, Pichunda, and Gagri.

The Caucasus is, in the true sense of the word, thickly studded with strongholds, the Russian Government having spared neither money nor labor, to secure this highland region by well-placed fortifications. This applies especially

to Trans-Caucasia, containing many works of the first class, constructed on the latest principles, and strictly in conformity to the configuration of the country. Hence it is not to be denied that in the Caucasus, as now fortified, Russia possesses a very strong, not to say impregnable, bulwark, from whence her armies may be poured both into Asia Minor and Central Asia, as the case may be: and behind which her troops, if beaten, may retreat to be reinforced and to recover their strength in safety.

Russia's Forces in the Caucasus.

The Caucasian Army is divided into seven divisions [corps], comprising the following troops:—

Infantry.

4	Grenadier regiments of 4 battalions each, ...	17,708 men.
24	Infantry „ of 4 „ „ ...	105,528 „
4	Fusilier battalions, ...	4,460 „
4	Kuban Fusilier battalions, ...	4,404 „
7	Cordon battalions, ...	7,898 „
1	Regiment of garrison infantry, ...	4,302 „
18	Local battalions and 64 local companies, ...	32,493 „
2	Sapper battalions, ...	2,000 „
	Total ...	178,793 „

Cavalry.

1	Caucasian Dragoon division (4 regiments of 6 squadrons each)	5,470 troopers.
30	Cossack regiments of 6 sotnias each ...	27,720 „
15	Terek Cossack regiments of 4 sotnias each ...	9,315 „
3	Astrakhan Cossack regiments of 4 sotnias each	1,863 „
	Total ...	44,368 „

Artillery.

6	Foot-brigades of 6 batteries (6 guns each), ...	216 guns.
1	„ „ of 8 „ (8 „ „), ...	64 „
5	Mounted batteries of Kuban Artillery of 8 guns, ...	40 „
2	Mounted batteries of Terek Artillery of 8 guns, ...	16 „
	Total ...	336. „

The militia may be estimated at 5,000 men (3,000 foot and 2,000 horse). Hence the entire army of the Caucasus comprises: of infantry, 181,793 men; 46,368 troopers; and 336 pieces of artillery. This army forms the permanent garrison of Caucasia, and is strengthened according to the exigencies of the service.

The infantry are armed with the Berdan breech-loading rifle, the cavalry with the breech-loading carbine of the same inventor, their side-arm being the Dragoon sword; a portion of the Cossacks carry lances.

The artillery have three, four, and nine-pounder breech-loading guns of various patterns.

To the Russian forces in Asia, the army of the Caucasus stands in the position of a *cadre*; and, as previously observed, the Caucasian troops are always ready to descend at the word of command, either to the steppes of Asia or Turkish Armenia.

Further we must mention the Russian war-flotilla on the Caspian, which may be utilized for the transport of troops and supplies, and which comprises the following vessels:—

3 Screw gun-boats with	...	...	13 guns.
7 Steamers with ...	...	...	17 „
3 Screw schooners with	...	...	14 „
4 Steam launches „	...	...	5 „
4 Transport sailing vessels 2 Schooners, and ... 8 Barques, ...	with together	...	49 „

Lastly, the 'Kafkas and Mercury Steam Navigation Company' are bound to maintain not less than fifteen steamers, all of which are at the disposal of the Russian Government in case of war, an agreement which applies likewise, to the steamers and sailing vessels of the 'Lébed (Swan) Company.'

Russia's Army in Asia

is made up of—

60,800 infantry,
32,650 horses, and
112 guns;—with a reserve of—
26,000 infantry, and
10,000 horses.

These numbers include garrisons and local troops. The armature is analogous to that of the Caucasian Army.

Considering [the wide extent of] Russia's frontiers in Central Asia, and the acquisitions which she has made in so short a time, England's apprehensions certainly appear to be anything but groundless—although it does strike one as something fabulous that with so small an army Russia should be able to maintain her sway throughout so immense an expanse of country: in addition to which she is not only successfully keeping together the most heterogeneal elements, but even pursuing an aggressive line of policy, leading to further incorporations of territory in quick succession. Yet, strange as these facts may appear, they are simple enough, and may be easily explained by the utter worthlessness of the Asiatics as warriors; their separation into innumerable nationalities, tribes, clans, &c., and the lack of unanimity resulting therefrom; their primitive armature; and by the all but indifferent attitude of the English since the Afghan war, after which they scarcely sought to revive their influence over Central Asia, until roused from their lethargy by Russia's go-ahead policy.

The Strategical Situation.

General Observations.

The Caucasus is an Alpine mountain region which, owing to the construction of an extensive network of roads under the Russian régime, has become quite pervious in the strategical sense of the word. This applies particularly to the Western branch of the chain, which is crossed by six different routes—between the Strait of Kerch and the Marukh Pass. The section extending from the latter to the great Caucasian roadway, is still impervious; and over the Eastern branch there lead three routes, including the great roadway.

From a strategical stand-point, a mountain range crossed by many lines of communication is better adapted for the offensive than for the defensive mode of warfare. Nevertheless, the defensibility of the Western branch of the Caucasus is not impaired, despite the six routes which cross the same: because the Russian Government, commanding the coast, have secured the approaches to them by means of forts, in addition to which they are guarded by fortified military stations and strongholds, placed along the second line of defence. Owing to the peculiar configuration of the country, an invasion cannot be effected except by way of

one of the made roads: hence the forts and strongholds—which command the lines of communication at very ably-chosen points—must necessarily prove most serious obstacles.

Three transverse lines connect the thoroughfares intersecting the mountains: all naturally strong points and lines, requiring but a passive mode of defence, being fortified accordingly; such of the lines, on the other hand, as are better adapted for operating on the offensive, have been treated in a manner facilitating the sortie-style of warfare. The '*Rokade*'-lines, being covered by fortifications, are intended to serve as lines of defence, which—generally speaking, and considering how easily they may be broken in upon—must be regarded a mistake. In the Caucasus, however, this is scarcely of any consequence: for the mountain system is quite impervious and cannot be crossed at all, except by way of the roads constructed by the Russian Government, which are well fortified. As to the tracts of country lying between these roads, they are sufficiently covered—either by the configuration of the mountains, or by a river-barrier in front.

We will now proceed to describe the—

Lines of Defence.

I. The line along the frontier of the region, supported by Fort Nikalaya, and the strongholds of Akhaltsikh, Alexandropol, Surmaly, Shusha, and Akh Oglan.

II. This line of defence runs along the north-eastern coast of the Black Sea; from Poti it turns eastwards to Kutais (fortress) and Tiflis, beyond which it is covered by the rapid current of the Kúr. The middle course of this river is bridged at Elisabethpol, and its lower course at Kalakoiny and Saliany.

III. The fortified line Andréyefsk, Adagum, Grigoryefsk, Kaladjinsk, Ustjúgúta, Kislovodsk, Nalchik, Vladikafkas, Veden, and Temirkhanshura, which would prevent the enemy from deploying their forces on issuing from the mountains.

In rear of this line, reserves and supplies can be safely concentrated and brought up to the front, for which purpose five railroads are available. Of these latter, three connect

the interior of the Russian Empire with the River Volga, the fourth leads to Vladikafkas, and the fifth from Poti (east-coast of the Black Sea) to Tiflis.

In order to examine these lines of defence from a military point of view, we must draw a distinction between operations on the defensive, and such on the offensive, commencing our examination with those on—

A. The Defensive,

which may be divided into—

I. The defence in front of the mountains *(Gebirgsgürtel)*, and—II. The defence in rear of the same.

The line of defence in front runs along the transversals I. and II.; but I. is fortified on a plan conducive to action on the offensive. On the main line of operations stands Alexandropol, forming an intrenched camp with detached *(Gürtel)*-forts, greatly facilitating sorties. The by-lines are marked out by Akhaltsikh (favoring an advance from the north-west), and by Ani and Surmaly on the south. On the defensive, these strongholds protect the position on the main line of operations against being turned by way of the by-lines, which latter—running aside of the main line and leading into the Alpine region proper—at the same time facilitate sudden movements on the offensive, as well as flank-manœuvres. The distance from this line to the principal basis (line III.) is 55 miles (= 417·20 Km.), that is, far enough to expose the transport of supplies and even the safety of the communications. This drawback, however, is counterbalanced by line II., which, trending about midway between I. and III., runs at a distance of 25 miles (=189 Km.) from the former, and 30 miles (=227 Km.) from the latter. As to line II. in particular, it has the disadvantage of being rather unsuitable for action on the offensive: for should once line I. be lost, the northern slopes of the Pensathi Range and the southern Kúr ridges (following the course of that river) would have to be scaled [under fire of the enemy]. As an intervening basis, however, it forms an important link, connecting line I. with the principal basis (line III.); and in case of need it may afford a safe lodgement to fall back upon for the troops of line I., who could take up a strong position on the defensive, covered by the river-barrier [in front] and supported by the fortifications commanding the most important points.

Along line III. the mountains are defended from positions in the rear thereof. Like I., it has a number of well-constructed fortifications, which, however, are less appropriate to support operations—

B. On the Offensive,

than those of line I., both the works and roads of which are of a type to facilitate attacks [from the side of Caucasia]. This tells especially against Asia Minor, though, on the other hand, the Caucasus is nearly as important with reference to Russia's movements in Central Asia (see page 17 below).

Acting on the offensive against Asia Minor, the Russian army would naturally seek its support on, and rendezvous about the strongholds of, line I. Presuming the basis of all operations to be marked out between Nikolaya and Mount Great Ararat, the centre of attack would point straight at Erzeroum, presenting itself as the first political object of operations in that direction, and situated 30 miles (=227 Km.) from Russia's basis. To effect this attack, the Russian forces may avail themselves of the following routes *(Linien)*:—

First and foremost: the principal and most direct route from Alexandropol *viâ* Kars, Déli-Músa and Koprikoi to Erzeroum. Ten miles (=75 Km.) from Alexandropol rises Kars, a Turkish fortress of the first class; it commands the road to Erzeroum, and cannot be ignored. Five miles (=37 Km.) distant from Kars, on the crossing of the Alexandropol-Erivan road, lies the fortress of Déli-Músa: and two miles to the west of it, on the Erivan road, that of Gechevan. These two strongholds bar defiles and cannot be evaded, except by infantry at very close quarters; once isolated, however, all arms may pass them safely on the west side, proceeding along the southern foot of the Kumry Range (8,791 feet=2,778 M.), for there is a road connecting Kars with Khorassán. Lastly, the Russian army would strike upon Koprikoi, a fortress standing five miles (=37 Km.) to the eastward of Erzeroum.

This line forms the shortest connection between the basis of operations and the object of attack; but it has the disadvantage that Kars must first be taken before the offensive can take its course, unless the Russian force be numerous enough to invest the place, at the same time continuing operations. On the march from Kars to Erzeroum, the strongholds Déli-Músa and Gechevan could be evaded by passing northward of them, but not without

leaving strong detachments of observation at both, for a disregard of this precaution might expose the left flank of the advancing column. The line of retreat leads back on Alexandropol (centre of the basis) from which the retreating army cannot be forced away, and where it may find protection and safety within the fortress.

Collateral (Neben) Lines of Operating on the Offensive.

a, The line along the Black Sea coast, which is intended to secure line *b*, against surprises from the sea-side. To this end a column need but occupy the coast abreast of the invading army, proceeding as the latter advances, to conclude its task under the walls of Trebizond. To fulfil its double purpose, this column must be sufficiently strong to leave garrisons at all important points *en route*, able to frustrate any hostile attempt at landing till the threatened localities can be reinforced by the Commander-in-Chief; if supported by a flotilla, the difficulties of its task could, of course, be considerably lessened.

Between Nikolaya and Trebizond this line issues four transversals connecting it with line *b*. Hence too weak a Russian column might easily be harassed in rear, unless every hostile attempt at landing be promptly forestalled by the army head-quarters: indeed, in case of retreat it might even be involved in a catastrophe, especially if the fortress of Kintryshi and the passes across the Kolar Mountains happen to be still in the hands of the Turks at the time.

b, The line Akhaltsikh, Machkal, Artvin, Thortum, Erzeroum—by which the Turkish fortress Ardahan can be evaded. Ardahan, at a distance of nine miles, commands the ordinary cart-way between Akhaltsikh and Kars. Further on, the operations of a column would be influenced by the fortress of Ardanauch, situated five miles to the northward of the route, and by that of Pertakrek, two miles to the west. Five miles beyond Erzeroum the way is barred by the fortress of Koprikoi.

This collateral line of operations could only be made available by a Russian army strong enough to isolate Kars and Ardahan. Such an army might turn the Turkish positions and take Erzeroum by surprise, provided it be

numerous enough to overawe the garrisons of Ardanauch and Pertakrek without interrupting its onward march. From Machkal, however, this line runs nearly parallel with the basis, which is a drawback: for in case the Turks assume the offensive along the principal line of operations, they may seriously threaten the retreat from Ardanauch and Ardahan, and the Russians may even be driven into the Koilar Mountains, unless they are quick about gaining Machkal, to retreat on Atchj.

c, The line from Erivan *viâ* Bayazid to Diadin, beyond which, turning towards the north-west, it strikes upon the main route and continues *viâ* Hassan Kalé to Erzeroum. As far as Bayazid this line runs close to the Persian frontier, but is less exposed, notwithstanding. By way of the northerly projecting corner of Persia, *viâ* Akhakhmed, the Russians may evade the difficult crossing of the Ararat; this, however, would imply an understanding with Persia, without the neutrality of which country a Russian column could scarcely venture to take this line, except under risk of exposing its flank to attacks from that quarter. In any case it would be indispensable to detach corps of observation against the southerly situated strongholds of Begirkala, Khamúr, and Melaskerd. If Persia and Russia prove to be allied (which is by no means impossible), the troops of the former may either strive to effect a junction at Bayazid, or, undertaking to cover the left flank, advance *viâ* Malakaskar on Erzeroum—there to join the Russian army. In a retreat, this column would have nothing to fear, at least so long as the Turkish strongholds on the left flank were kept isolated.

The greatest distance between the principal line and its collaterals, as well as between the latter separately, amounts to 20 miles (=152 Km.). Parallel roads are all but unknown, and all these lines concentrate on Erzeroum.

The corps operating along these routes would have to depend wholly upon themselves, for mutual support is not feasible, owing to the non-existence of transverse connecting roads and the difficult character of the country intervening. Any co-operation and mutual support could only come into play within six miles (= 45 Km.) of Erzeroum.

Once in possession of Erzeroum, Russia's further operations would entirely depend on the degree of exhaustion of her enemy, the condition and strength of her own army, and from the aspect of the political horizon: therefore it is impossible to draw any conclusion as to what may or may not happen. Regarding the chances of success or defeat on either side, we do not propose weighing them, and may, therefore, conclude this paragraph by simply mentioning the lines of operation leading from Erzeroum to the Strait of Constantinople (Bosphorus). These are:—

1, The line following the coast of the Black Sea;

2, The line Shabin, Niskar, Mersivan, Osmanshik, Boly, Ismid, and Skutari; which forms the shortest route;

3, The line Egin, Kara Magara, Yazgad, Engúri, Nally-khan, and Ismid;

4, That of Kharpút, Malatti, Albistan, Kaisarih, and Nevshehr [Kir Shehr?], along the north-eastern shores of lake Tuz Ghieul to Bash Khan: or—across the salt-steppe *viá* Severek to Afium Karahissár, and from thence in a northerly direction *viá* Brussa to Skutari; (The Russians would not follow this line unless the Turks had been previously driven to the south of lines 2 and 3; but even in this case, the main body ought to follow up the pursuit along the shorter line 3, whereby the retreat of the Turkish army might be cut off completely, or, at any rate, considerably delayed. These lines [1 to 4] radiate from Erzeroum and concenter upon the Bosphorus);

5, The line from Malatti to the Mediterranean, then along the sea-side as far as Adalia, and from thence *viá* Denizli to Smyrna.

Strategical Observations with Regard to Central Asia.

Russia's army in Central Asia has its main support in that of the Caucasus, from whence it receives its equipment and all sorts of supplies, by way of Astrakhan, Petrofsk, and Baku. The transports from the interior of the Empire come by way of the 'Rostof,' 'Vladikafkas,' and 'Poti-Tiflis' rail-roads: and the Imperial and commercial flotillas of the East convey them across the Caspian Sea.

The most important tract of country with reference to Russia's policy is that extending from the ridges of the Elbrus Chain to the south-coast of the Caspian. We regard this tract as an indispensable factor in her hands, without which she could scarcely hope to consolidate her sway in Central Asia. Its possession enables Russia completely to paralize Persia, and to exercise a moral pressure upon Afghanistan. As yet the Court of Kabul still looks with self-confidence upon the independency of the Turkoman tribes dwelling in the Trans-Caspian Region; but these tribes are being rapidly rendered amenable to Russia's supremacy, and their submission will open all the gates throughout Central Asia to Russian influence. The success in Turkomania is entirely due to the possession of Caucasia, from whence alone she can promptly and effectually operate in that direction.

The Caucasus also forms a connecting link between the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf, and may enable Russia to establish a naval station in the Strait of Hormúz—thereby realizing a long-cherished scheme of the greatest magnitude in its consequences to Central Asia and Turkey in Asia, for in both directions she may then press forward with double vigor, from a basis extending from Caucasia to the Arabian Sea. Russia is indefatigably striving for an open sea-board, not too far from Europe and affording her direct access to the Ocean highways of the world; once mistress of the Persian Gulf, she may hope to see her ambition gratified: hence she will not cease pushing ahead in that direction.

Again with regard to Merv—which Russia would fain take by a *coup de main*, from thence to direct further operations—the Caucasus as a basis affords her much better a chance, than Orenburg. For Krasnovodsk (in steam-connection with Baku) lies only 600 versts (about 400 English miles) from New Urganj, whereas the distance from Orenburg, taking the nearest route along the west-coast of the Aral, amounts to 1,300 versts (about 860 English miles); the longer route by way of Kazalinsk measures 1,500 versts or nearly 1,000 English miles. It takes caravans 50 days or more to reach Orenburg, but only 19, and with good camels only 12 days, to accomplish the distance to Krasnovodsk. Allowing 15 days to represent a fair average, and counting five days for the transport from Krasnovodsk to Astrakhan, and five days more from Astrakhan to Moscow, it will be seen that a caravan from New Urganj can easily

reach Moscow within 25 to 30 days, whereas it would need from two and a half to three months by way of Orenburg.

Concluding Inference.

In the preceding pages we have shortly described such of the ethnographical and geographical characteristics of the Caucasus as influence its defensive power; further the changes wrought throughout the region by the Russian Government; and, lastly, we have shewn of how great a value to Russia this highland region is. The inferences to be drawn from the foregoing may be summed up as follows:—

Russia's desire to extend her dominion towards the south of Europe, led to the division of Poland, of which she appropriated the lion's share; since then, however, the outspoken resistance of the European Powers has put a stop to her spreading in that direction. Not strong enough to realize her schemes in Europe, Russia began striving for a way into Asia Minor, and at the same time to widen her sphere of power towards Central Asia—for the double purpose of breaking the influence of England, and to mature herself for action in Europe.

By the conquest of Caucasia and its conversion into a secure basis, Russia has placed herself in a position to execute these designs. From the Caucasus her armies may now descend to the Bosphorus, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, or the Arabian Sea, and from thence she may advantageously support her operations against India. Again, in the Caucasus she possesses a safe retreat if defeated or repulsed; and, considering the natural configuration of the region and its works of defence, the chances of a successful invasion are exceedingly small. In this well fortified highland region the Russian Armies can always safely collect after a defeat, be reinforced, and prepare themselves for fresh operations. By reason of its extensive network of roads and roadways, and its many fortified points and strongholds, the Caucasus offers great facilities for the offensive, both against Turkish Armenia and Central Asia; on the other hand, art and nature combined have rendered it a bulwark which may well be considered strong enough to resist all attacks. Hence from the Caucasus, Russia may all but scot-free pursue her traditional policy of conquest towards the west and south.

Once in possession of Armenia, the country westwards as far as Skutari presents no strategical or tactical impediments; the establishment of permanent Russian settlements on the shores of the Arabian Sea is merely a question of time; owing to her judicious treatment of the weaknesses and passions of the Central Asian nations, Russia has succeeded in acquiring great influence among them: can it be doubted, in face of these truths, that the overthrow of Afghanistan and the fall of East Turkestan will follow, and that Russia will not rest till her eastern frontier line shall run parallel to the China Sea.* The consequences which must attend such an extension of Russia's sway in Asia are so obvious that we need not here enlarge upon them; but we are fully alive to the fact that her weight in Europe must necessarily increase to an overwhelming magnitude, and may afford her the power of realizing her plans in the West. Hence we would fain repeat that, in this respect, the interests of the continental powers are identical with those of England, and that the whole of Europe would do well, to veto Russia's ambition by a combined "Halt!" ere it be too late for words.

Every page in history bears witness to Russia's perfectly regardless system of utilization, by means of which she has ever understood how to turn complications to her own advantage. But it is not only the acquisition of lands, it is also the possession of such points which bear upon the trade of Europe, that has an enormous influence in making the welfare of nations, and upon which even the material prosperity of a people may chiefly depend. The custom-boundaries *(Zollschranken)* which Russia has established between herself and Germany, may serve to indicate what her attitude would be, if she succeed in obtaining command over the main arteries of the traffic [of the world].

The aim of Russia's policy of conquest is to extend her sphere of power till it commence in Mid-Europe and reach as far as the China Sea: to effectually counteract this, she must, in the first place, be stripped of the Caucasus and of the Polish belt of fortresses. Unless this can be achieved, it is difficult to conceive a method of checking Russia. The

* [Owing to her prodigious wealth in coal, China would certainly prove a most valuable acquisition in the hands of any European nation. As to Russia in particular, her population will, at the present rate, double itself in less than 70 years, and the checks now preventing a still more rapid increase must, for decades to come, lose in force as the Russian nation will attain higher steps of civilization—a circumstance which must very considerably help to shape the future eastern policy of Russia.]—*Tr.*

possibility of doing it lies in the number and strength of the European armies, supported by England's navy: and in the disposition both of the Caucasian tribes and Poles.

So long, however, as Russia keeps possession of Caucasia and the Polish strongholds, she will neither forego her traditional policy of conquest, nor give up striving for the supreme command over the trade of the world, and must, therefore, continue a standing danger to the existence of all independent States and Nations.

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